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ABSTRACT 
 Current research on anti-gay attitudes has focused heavily on heterosexuals versus 
non-heterosexuals, with very little research delving into the differences within these 
“non-heterosexual” groups. The author conducted an exploratory analysis of how the 
intersectional effect of gender and sexual orientation affect perceptions of target groups’ 
gender and sexuality, which in turn might explain different levels of prejudice toward 
LGBT subgroups. Based on previous studies, the author hypothesized that participants 
would believe that a gay male has a more fixed sexuality than a lesbian, leading in turn to 
higher levels of moral outrage. This study further aims to extend the literature to 
perceptions of bisexual and transgender individuals by testing competing hypotheses. 
Participants might feel less moral outrage toward these groups than other LGBT 
subgroups because they believe their sexuality is even less fixed than lesbians’. 
Alternatively, participants might feel more moral outrage toward bisexual and 
transgender targets (versus other LGBT groups) because of the uncomfortable feeling of 
uncertainty about these groups’ sexuality and/or gender. Overall, participants 
demonstrated an interactive effect of gender and sexuality on factors including perceived 
sexual orientation, perceived biological sex, perceived gender identity, perceived sexual 
fixedness, and moral outrage rather than gender having a main effect on perceptions of 
gender and sexual orientation having a main effect on perceptions of sexuality. 
Furthermore, perceptions of sexual fixedness mediated the effect of gender on moral 
outrage for heterosexual target groups, but not gay targets. Gender certainty mediated the 
effect of gender on moral outrage for pre-op transgender target groups, but not 
heterosexuals. This work is important to inform future research on the topics of the 
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intersection of sexuality and gender, especially to extend the limited literature on 
perceptions of bisexual and transgender individuals. 
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Introduction 
 Gender and sexual orientation play an important role in our everyday lives. 
Although the legal system has made a lot of progress toward equality for women and 
LGBT individuals, there is much anecdotal and empirical evidence demonstrating that 
implicit biases and negative attitudes toward women and the LGBT community might 
still exist. Several instances of businesses discriminating against gay and lesbian couples 
have been reported in the past few years, from pizzerias and bakeries to photographers 
refusing to cater to gay and lesbian weddings (Weingus, 2015; McGough, 2015; Barnes, 
2014). Further, there are still several states that do not have laws prohibiting 
discrimination against LGBT individuals, meaning many places are still able to 
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation for employment and housing (Brown, 
2015). The current project was designed to investigate what perceptions and  opinions 
concerning gender and sexuality might underlie prejudicial attitudes and discrimination 
toward LGBT groups. For example, the continued debate over whether people are born 
gay or actively decide to be gay has implications for anti-gay prejudicial attitudes (Dar-
Nimrod & Heine, 2010; Herek & Capitanio, 1995; Sakalli, 2002). Specifically, people 
who believe that homosexuality is a controllable factor exhibit more negative perceptions 
of gays and lesbians, and conversely people who believe that sexual orientation is 
determined biologically exhibit more positive perceptions of gays and lesbians. 
Investigating the roots of anti-LGBT attitudes is an important first step to combatting the 
anti-gay discrimination that stems from these attitudes. 
 However, the literature on anti-gay attitudes is lacking when it comes to the 
interaction of sexual orientation and gender. Attitudes toward, for example, gay males 
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often do not generalize to lesbians, despite their shared LGBT status. Furthermore, most 
research into anti-gay attitudes has focused on the L and G of LGBT, with very little 
focus on bisexual and transgender individuals. That is, it is likely that people hold 
different attitudes toward bisexual and transgender individuals when compared to gay 
men and lesbians, but we do not know how exactly are they perceived differently. 
Anecdotally speaking, we know that bisexuals and transgender individuals experience 
discrimination and hate crimes (such as transgender individuals being attacked and even 
killed; Frosch, 2008), but what kinds of perceptions might underlie the intense negative 
prejudice that might underlie these hate crimes? 
More specifically, I conducted an empirical analysis of how the intersectionality 
of sexual orientation and gender leads to differential perceptions of gender and sexuality 
and, in turn, prejudice. I also specifically aimed to get a clearer picture of how people 
perceive bisexual and transgender individuals, given the lack of extant research on these 
groups. To accomplish these goals, I will first discuss the existing literature on sexual 
prejudice. Next I will discuss the differences between perceptions of and attitudes toward 
gay men versus lesbians, and further expand this into a review of how perceptions of 
gender and sexual orientation are interconnected. I will then explain how these factors 
might predict prejudice. Finally, I will present a study that extends the reviewed research 
to compare a host of different perceptions and reactions to different target groups based 
on the intersection of gender and sexual orientation. 
Sexual Prejudice 
Although, colloquially, people use the term homophobia to refer to prejudice 
against sexual minorities, Herek (2000a) argues that this term is incorrect because it 
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implies that the prejudice is based on irrational fears (because of the term phobia). 
Heterosexism, on the other hand, generally refers to prejudice and discrimination toward 
non-heterosexual groups at a societal level. Heterosexist beliefs and behaviors can be 
influenced by many factors, such as participant gender, age, religion, etc. (for a review, 
see Hebl, Law, & King, 2010). At the individual level, Herek (2000a) suggests that 
sexual prejudice refers to negative attitudes toward non-heterosexuals. Some use these 
terms interchangeably, however, meaning that heterosexism might refer to the individual 
level, and homophobia might actually be referring to sexual prejudice, and so on. 
Regardless of which term is used, it is clear from both anecdotal and empirical evidence 
that prejudice exists toward non-heterosexuals (Herek, 2000a). Although on one level 
“non-heterosexual” is a helpful umbrella category that captures the heterosexist nature of 
sexual prejudice, it refers to multiple subgroups of sexual minorities who might 
experience different levels and types of prejudice. Often called the lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and transgender (LGBT) community, these subgroups created by the intersection of 
sexual orientation and gender minorities are lumped together despite being unique, 
distinct groups. Failing to investigate the differences in prejudice toward subgroups might 
obscure the psychological underpinnings of this prejudice and prevent us from 
understanding the roots of sexual prejudice. Thus, one goal of the current research is to 
investigate each of these groups independently. How do people perceive gay individuals, 
bisexuals, and transgender individuals—and even further, do these perceptions differ 
depending on the target’s gender?   
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Gay Men vs. Lesbians 
 Originally, research on anti-gay attitudes lumped gay men and lesbians into one 
category of “homosexuals” (Brady & Busse, 1994; Cass, 1984; Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 
2008) effectively ignoring possible target gender differences. More recently, though, 
researchers have investigated how perceptions of gay men differ from those of lesbians. 
This research indicates that gay men are generally perceived more negatively than 
lesbians (Blashill & Powlishta, 2010; Kerns & Fine, 1994). People also make different 
specific assumptions about gay men versus lesbians. Taylor (1983) found that 
participants drew distinctions between gay men and lesbians on multiple variables, such 
as believing gay men needed the approval of others and were more expressive of their 
feelings than lesbians. Herek (2002) found that heterosexuals rated gay men as more 
mentally ill and less fit to adopt children than lesbians. Furthermore, Herek (2000b) 
found that, although heterosexual women perceived gay men and lesbian similarly, 
heterosexual men indicated that they felt significantly less warm toward gay men than 
lesbians. Generally speaking, people seem to believe that gay men and lesbians have 
more similar character traits to the opposite sex than to their own (e.g., gay men have 
more similar characteristics to women than to men). Kite and Deaux (1980), in support, 
described how people tend to apply implicit inversion theory to gays and lesbians. That 
is, participants perceive gay men as more similar to heterosexual women (compared to 
heterosexual men and lesbians), and perceive lesbians as more similar to heterosexual 
men than heterosexual women or gay men. 
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The Intersectionality of Sexual Orientation and Gender 
 Some characteristics are perceived to be interconnected with each other, even if 
they do not necessarily impact each other in reality. For example, racial and gender 
stereotypes often overlap (Galinsky, Hall, & Cuddy, 2013). Specifically, Galinsky and 
colleagues found interactions such that, when compared to White women, Asian women 
were seen as more feminine, but Black women were actually seen as more masculine. 
Furthermore, White men reported being more attracted to Asian women over Black 
women, but women reported the opposite pattern (i.e., more attracted to Black men over 
Asian men). This phenomenon of two different group memberships being intertwined 
might also be the case for sexual orientation and gender—perhaps even more so 
considering that there are groups that are specifically defined by the mix of their gender 
and sexuality (e.g., a lesbian is specifically a homosexual female). Inferences people 
draw about a target’s sexuality might be different based on the target’s. Similarly, the 
inferences people draw about a target’s gender might depend on their sexual orientation. 
In other words, the assumption that reactions to different LGBT groups will generalize 
across genders might be flawed—it might be the intersection of gender and sexual 
orientation that is important. For example, past research indicates that people’s 
perceptions depend on the combination of sexual orientation and gender. For example, 
Herek (2002) reported that heterosexual women felt more negatively toward bisexual 
men and women than gay men and lesbians, while heterosexual men felt more negatively 
toward bisexual and gay men when compared to both bisexual women and lesbians. 
Eliason (1997) found that bisexual men were perceived more negatively than both gay 
men and lesbians, who were themselves seen more negatively than bisexual women. 
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These studies indicate that it not a matter of simple differences in sexual orientation, but 
an interaction of sexual orientation and gender that might determine prejudicial reactions. 
Further, transgender individuals are often lumped in with gays, lesbians, and bisexuals 
(i.e., “LGBT” community; Worthen, 2013), even though being transgender is defined by 
gender, not sexual orientation; transgender individuals can be of any sexual orientation. 
It is possible that all groups that stray from sexual and gender norms are generally 
lumped together because they are all counter-normative. Indeed, research indicates that 
people do not like others who violate sexual orientation and gender norms, and are even 
less fond of “double offenders” (those who violate both sexual orientation and gender 
norms; Lehavot & Lambert, 2007). This trend is evident in research on perceptions of 
masculine versus feminine gays and lesbians (Cohen, Hall, & Tuttle, 2009; Glick, 2007; 
Kite & Deaux, 1987; Laner & Laner, 1980; Walker, 2012). Feminine lesbians are 
perceived more positively than masculine lesbians (Cohen et al., 2009; Laner & Laner, 
1980), while feminine gay men are perceived more negatively than masculine gay men 
(Glick, 2007). Because men are expected to be masculine and women feminine, these 
groups that do not follow these norms (i.e., feminine men and masculine women) are 
violating gender norms. Coupled with the violation of sexual norms that comes with 
identifying as gay or lesbian, feminine gay men and masculine lesbians are thus “double 
offenders,” and are perceived particularly negatively as a result. 
Gays and lesbians might face less prejudice than bisexual and transgender 
individuals given that they are at least clearly defined by their gender and sexual 
orientation. Bisexuals and transgender individuals, on the other hand, are less easily 
defined. These groups are not clearly defined by a single sexual orientation or gender, 
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and thus are much more ambiguous. In fact, these groups are defined by their ambiguity: 
bisexuals are sometimes attracted to men and sometimes women, thus exhibiting sexual 
orientation ambiguity. Transgender are ambiguous in terms of gender: They either 
identify as a different gender than their biological sex or have taken measures to change 
their sex.  
This ambiguity and intermingling of perceptions of sexuality and gender might 
mean that people make inferences about gender based on sexuality and people might 
make inferences about sexuality based on gender. In other words, rather than a gender 
label having a main effect on perceptions of gender, or a sexual orientation label having a 
main effect on perceptions of sexuality, the two labels might interact to predict these 
perceptions. More specifically, how people perceive different LGBT groups’ sexuality 
might depend on gender, and how people perceive different gender groups’ gender might 
depend on their sexual orientation. People might particularly struggle with perceptions of 
sexual orientation and gender for these more ambiguous groups, such as bisexual and 
transgender individuals.  
There is not a lot of research investigating perceptions of bisexuals. This small 
body of research has demonstrated that although people tend to place gay men (Glick, 
2007; Kite & Deaux, 1987; Madon, 1997) and lesbians (Brambilla, Carnaghi, & 
Ravenna, 2011; Geiger, Harwood, & Hummert, 2006; Walker, 2012) into masculine and 
feminine subgroups, they are less likely to be able to identify bisexuals based on 
appearance (Hayfield, 2013). Herek (2002) found that female participants felt 
significantly less warmth toward bisexual women and men than gay men and lesbians. 
However, male participants felt less warmth toward both heterosexual and bisexual male 
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targets as compared to female targets. In other words, women were more focused on the 
sexual orientation – preferring gay men and lesbians to bisexuals; whereas men were 
more focused on gender – preferring women to men. Thus, the present research on 
perceptions of bisexuals is minimal and unclear, and needs to be extended to more fully 
understand perceptions of bisexuals and how they might differ from other LGBT 
subgroups. 
Transgender individuals are unique in the LGBT community because, as 
previously mentioned, they are not defined by their sexuality. Anecdotally, transgender 
individuals face discrimination. North Carolina, for instance, recently passed a bill that 
mandates that people use bathrooms only matching the gender on their birth certificate 
(Miller, 2016). Supporters claim this will make women and children safer, indicating a 
belief that transgender individuals are inherently sexually deviant, if not dangerous. 
Transgender individuals are rarely visible in the media, except in these negative 
scenarios, which might feed into these negative perceptions of transgender individuals. 
However, there has been very little empirical research on perceptions of transgender 
individuals; that is, almost all of the current research investigating transgender 
individuals focuses on the clinical or personal experience of transgender individuals 
rather than how they are perceived (Clarke, Hayfield, & Huxley 2012; McKinney, 2005; 
Toomey, Ryan, Diaz, Card, & Russell, 2010). Norton and Herek (2013) asked 
participants how warm they felt toward sexual minority groups (gay men, lesbians, 
bisexual men, and bisexual women) and transgender individuals (without specifying 
gender). They found that participants’ ratings of transgender individuals positively 
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significantly more negatively than the other groups. That is, participants felt the least 
warm toward transgender individuals when compared to gay men, lesbians, and 
bisexuals. Thus, the only study specifically comparing transgender targets to other LGBT 
subgroups suggests prejudice might be particularly high. However, not only did this not 
give an idea about perceptions of transgender individuals by gender, but it also did not 
indicate whether there were differences in pre-op versus post-op transgender individuals. 
It is possible that people have different perceptions of these subgroups as well. In 
support, Gerhardstein and Anderson (2010) found that participants rated transgender 
targets whose facial features were gender-incongruent (i.e., a transgender male with 
feminine features or a transgender female with masculine features) to be less attractive 
than those whose features were congruent (i.e., a transgender male with masculine 
features or a transgender female with feminine features), leading to higher levels of 
transphobia. Because post-op transgender individuals physically change, perhaps they 
become more gender-congruent (compared to pre-op transgender individuals). I extended 
this limited research by (a) testing whether this prejudice was equally high for male and 
female transgender individuals (b) testing whether there was a difference for pre-op 
versus post-op transgender individuals, and (c) investigating what perceptions might 
explain this higher level of prejudice. 
Prejudice and Discrimination 
 These differences in perceptions of gender and sexuality would be particularly 
problematic if they resulted in differential levelf os prejudice and discrimination toward 
these groups. Although the Supreme Court recently legalized gay and lesbian marriage 
nationwide (de Vogue & Diamond, 2015), some states still allow for explicit 
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discrimination against the LGBT community in other ways. For example, Mississippi is 
currently voting on a bill that would explicitly allow for discrimination against LGBT 
individuals in employment, housing, providing services for same-sex weddings, and even 
allowing parents to force their LGBT children to go to conversion therapy (Allen, 2016). 
Several states have Romeo and Juliet laws that explicitly only apply to opposite-gender 
sex (Higdon, 2008). These laws offer protections for similarly-aged juveniles who engage 
in non-forced sexual acts that would otherwise result in criminal prosecution for statutory 
rape and the requirement to register as a sex offender. Some states explicitly state that 
these protections do not apply to same-sex teenagers. 
 Likewise, differential perceptions of gays and lesbians might impact their 
experiences with the legal system. For example, Kaitlyn Hunt had sex with her 14-year-
old girlfriend when she was 18 (Harrison, 2013). Though the sex was not forced, her 
girlfriend could not legally consent and Kaitlyn accepted a plea deal to avoid being 
placed on the sex offender registry, leading to a sentence of 4 months in jail, 2 years of 
house arrest, and 3 years of probation (Corcoran & Lanee, 2013). Matthew Limon, on the 
other hand, was also charged at the age of 18 for having non-forced oral sex with a 14-
year-old boy (Stout, 2003). However, he was sentenced to serve 17 years in prison (this 
has since been overturned, but he had to serve nearly 4 years in prison before then, while 
Kaitlyn was able to get a plea deal before spending any time in prison).  
There is a small body of literature providing empirical evidence consistent with 
this anecdotal example that suggests implicit anti-gay bias might lead to differential 
application of these laws. Salerno, Murphy, and Bottoms (2014) assessed public support 
for registering sex offenders based on sexual orientation and gender. Participants rated 
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their support for registering a juvenile sex offender for having non-forced (but technically 
illegal) sex with a similarly-aged peer. Participants were significantly more punitive 
toward gay males than heterosexual boys, but were actually marginally less punitive 
toward lesbians than heterosexual girls. Thus, it is clear that discrimination plays out very 
differently for males and females in this context: people want to punish gay boys more 
than heterosexual boys, but lesbians less than heterosexual girls. Thus, although most 
states no longer explicitly allow discrimination in sex offender registration, implicit 
biases against gay males might lead to differential application by law enforcement. This 
is just one of many examples of LGBT discrimination in legal judgments (e.g., Quas, 
Bottoms, Haegerich, & Nysse-Carris, 2002; Stawiski, Dykema- Engblade, & Tindale, 
2012; Walsh, 1994; Wiley & Bottoms, 2009, 2013)  
Although the differential laws that explicitly allowed for discrimination based on 
sexual orientation have been eradicated, these implicit biases affecting gay and lesbian 
individuals in the law are also evident outside of the legal system. Hebl, Foster, Mannix, 
and Dovidio (2002) had confederates pose as job applicants who wore hats printed with 
either stigmatizing (“Gay and Proud”) or non-stigmatizing (“Texan and Proud”) phrases. 
These confederates went to six different stores inquiring about available job 
opportunities, and subsequently rated the store employees on formal discrimination and 
how they treated them interpersonally. Potential employers did not formally discriminate 
against these participants in that they treated stigmatized and nonstigmatized individuals 
equally in terms of the extent to which they were honest with all participants about job 
availability, allowed them to complete a job application, called them back with job offers, 
and gave them permission to use their restroom. However, interpersonal discrimination 
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was apparent in that the potential employers spoke more negatively toward the 
stigmatized participants, and shortened the interaction time for these participants when 
compared to the non-stigmatized participants. Similarly, Hendren and Blank (2009) 
found that store clerks were not as willing to help customers wearing pro-gay shirts as 
compared to a control group of customers, further supporting the idea that this kind of 
interpersonal discrimination can negatively impact gay men and lesbians. 
So evidence indicates that there is prejudice against gay men and lesbians and that 
the degree of prejudice and discrimination might be different between gay men and 
lesbians, but why? One potential theoretical explanation, as mentioned previously, is 
implicit inversion theory (Kite & Deaux, 1980). To reiterate, people tend to believe that 
gay men are similar to heterosexual women, and lesbians are similar to heterosexual men. 
This assumed violation of gender norms might lead to prejudicial reactions. Another 
potential explanation offered by Pirlott and Neuberg (2014) is the idea that certain groups 
direct unwanted sexual attention more than others (i.e., heterosexuals might believe 
certain target groups are more likely to hit on them than others). Specifically, 
heterosexual women believed that bisexual men and women and lesbians all directed 
unwanted sexual interest toward them, while heterosexual men believed that it was 
bisexual and gay men who directed sexual interest toward them. Importantly, a follow-up 
study indicated that heterosexual men and women felt more negatively toward these same 
groups. Thus, this belief that certain groups might direct unwanted sexual interest to the 
perceiver might be what elicits the prejudicial reactions. Other potential explanations 
offered by Pirlott and Neuberg (2014) include in-group-out-group heterosexism (i.e., 
heterosexuals have prejudicial reactions based on sexual orientation alone), gender-norm 
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violation (i.e., heterosexuals experience prejudice toward gay men because they do not 
follow gender norms), and sexual identity threat (i.e., prejudice is a result of insecurities 
about one’s own sexual orientation). Pirlott and Neuberg’s data ultimately fit their 
explanation better than the alternatives. 
Perceptions of Sexuality and Gender  
 One goal of the current research is to investigate how people’s perceptions of 
individuals’ gender and sexuality are affected by the intersection of their sexual 
orientation and gender. A second goal is to identify which perceptions might explain 
potentially different levels of prejudice toward these subgroups. In other words, I tested 
whether the intersection of a target’s gender and sexual orientation would predict 
perceptions that, in turn, might influence prejudice toward subgroups of the LGBT 
community. Below, I review the potential perceptions that could be affected by the 
intersection of gender and sexual orientation. 
Perceived sexual orientation. The combination of sexual orientation and gender 
might lead people to draw different assumptions about a target group’s sexual orientation. 
People might not make the same assumptions about, for example, a gay male that they 
would for a lesbian in terms of their sexuality. In support, people are likely to perceive a 
girl kissing another girl in a college setting as heterosexual rather than bisexual or lesbian 
(Lannutti & Denes, 2012), whereas they might assume a boy kissing another boy in the 
same setting is gay. Identical same-gender sexual activity might lead to different 
perceptions of sexual orientation for men versus women. 
Perceived gender. Similarly, the combination of gender and sexual orientation 
might also affect belief about gender. People might, for instance, believe that gay men are 
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less male than straight men, as they are often perceived to be more feminine (Kite & 
Deaux, 1980). But when considering lesbians, people might consider them to be just as 
feminine as heterosexual women, considering the “lipstick lesbian” stereotype (e.g., a 
feminine lesbian; Geiger, Harwood, & Hummert, 2006). Further, gender roles are less 
strict for women, and thus lesbians might get a break in this sense (Pirlott & Neuberg, 
2014). It is also important to note the difference between perceptions of biological sex 
and gender identity. Here, I refer to biological sex as the physical characteristics 
(including genitalia, body shape, body hair, hormones, etc.) an individual is born with, 
whereas gender identity is how an individual personally defines their own gender. These 
two factors do not always align with each other, which might cause confusion about an 
individual’s gender. 
Gender and sexual orientation certainty. Why might a lack of certainty about 
an individual’s gender or sexual orientation impact prejudice? According to Hogg (2007), 
uncertainty is a very powerful motivator. Hogg’s Uncertainty-Identity Theory asserts that 
it is impossible to be completely certain of anything, so people are consistently driven to 
reduce high levels of uncertainty. Although people might feel some level of uncertainty 
about some LGBT groups’ gender and sexual orientation, it might only spark prejudice in 
certain contexts or for certain groups. That is, though gay men and lesbians might be 
disliked for violating sexual orientation norms, they are at least easily categorized. So 
people might be more prejudiced against bisexual and transgender (versus gay and 
lesbian) targets because they elicit greater uncertainty in terms of gender and sexual 
orientation.  
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Sexual fixedness. People might have different levels of prejudice toward LGBT 
individuals who they perceive as sexually deviant depending the degree to which they 
think their sexuality is fixed and unchangeable. Dweck’s Fixed versus Incremental 
Learning Theory (2000) proposed that intelligence is a factor that people might believe is 
either stable throughout time (fixed theory) or an ability that can be developed throughout 
the lifespan (incremental theory). People tend to perceive homosexuality more negatively 
overall if they believe it is a chosen trait than if they believe it is biological (Sakalli, 
2002; Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2010), indicating that people might differ in their belief that 
sexuality is a fixed versus flexible trait as well. This belief might vary based on the 
interaction of a target’s sexual orientation and gender. For instance, people perceive 
female sexuality as more flexible than male sexuality overall (Diamond, 2003; Peplau, 
2003), so it is likely that people will perceive lesbians as having a less fixed sexuality 
than gay males. Indeed, my past research indicates that people perceive lesbians to have 
significantly more malleable sexuality than gay men (Salerno, Malik, & Stevenson, in 
preparation). Thus, perceived sexual fixedness is likely to differ based on the 
combination of a target’s gender and sexual orientation. Furthermore, sexual fixedness 
might increase prejudicial reactions because participants believe the sexually deviant 
behavior is more likely to continue if the individual’s sexuality is fixed, rather than just a 
“phase” they will get over if the individual’s sexuality is more malleable. 
Moral Outrage 
 To assess prejudice toward targets, I assessed participants’ level of moral outrage 
toward each group. Moral outrage is a constellation of cognitive, affective, and 
behavioral negative reactions to a group or situation (Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004), 
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and thus might represent a particularly extreme form of prejudice. Research focusing on 
punishment motives links moral outrage to retributive motives (Carlsmith, Darly, & 
Robinson, 2002), and I have found that moral outrage is indeed a mediator that explains 
greater punitiveness toward gay male versus lesbian sex offenders (Salerno et al., in 
preparation). Furthermore, I found that overall, participants felt less moral outrage toward 
lesbians than gay men. Thus, I would expect to find this pattern here as well. I will extend 
this research to assess moral outrage toward bisexuals and transgender individuals.  
I will also investigate which perceptions (reviewed above) will affect moral 
outrage. My past studies indicate that sexual fixedness predicts moral outrage for gay 
men and lesbians (Malik & Salerno, 2016). Specifically, we found that lesbian juvenile 
sex offenders, when portrayed as feminine, are perceived as having a less fixed sexuality 
than when portrayed as masculine, leading to less moral outrage, and less punitiveness. 
Conversely, perceived sexual fixedness, moral outrage, and punitiveness were equally 
high for masculine and feminine (as well as straight girls and boys). However, 
participants believed lesbians (regardless of appearance) had lower sexual fixedness than 
gay boys overall, which lead to less moral outrage and less punitiveness. Thus, I expected 
sexual fixedness to again explain moral outrage. 
 It is also likely that levels of certainty regarding gender and sexual orientation 
will impact moral outrage. Because people are uncomfortable with ambiguity, they might 
feel more moral outrage toward bisexual and transgender individuals (as compared to 
other LGBT groups) because they feel less certain about their gender or sexual 
orientation.  
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The Present Study 
 The present study aims to extend the research in the area of perceptions toward 
LGBT individuals. Research, thus far, has focused on lesbians and gay men, with very 
little information about how bisexuals and transgender individuals are perceived. I 
hypothesized that there would be a significant interaction between a target’s sexual 
orientation and gender on perceptions of target groups’ gender and sexuality. In other 
words, gender and sexual orientation will be intertwined—people will judge (a) sexuality 
of the different LGBT groups differently based on gender and (b) gender of the different 
gender groups differently based on their LGBT status. Because this is the first study that I 
am aware of to directly compare perceptions of sexuality and gender for all of these 
groups, I took a very exploratory approach to my hypotheses. I did not have specific a 
priori hypotheses about the pattern of this interaction for all groups, but based on my 
previous research I did have predictions about gay men and lesbians. As previously 
stated, my past research has shown that participants feel less moral outrage toward 
lesbians as compared to gay men because they perceive their sexuality as less fixed. That 
is, people believe lesbians (as compared to gay men) are less fixed in their sexuality, and 
are thus less morally outraged toward them (Malik & Salerno, 2016). Drawing from this 
evidence, I predicted that the same would hold true here: specifically, that participants 
would believe gay men to have higher sexual fixedness, resulting in more moral outrage 
as compared to lesbians. Similarly, I would expect the same for heterosexual men and 
women, since participants would likely believe that heterosexual men are more fixed in 
their sexuality than heterosexual women. 
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Regarding bisexual and transgender groups, I had competing hypotheses. Because 
having a less fixed sexuality lead to less moral outrage for lesbians (vs. gay men), 
participants might perceive bisexual and transgender individuals to have an even less 
fixed sexuality and gender, respectively, leading to even less moral outrage toward these 
groups. On the other hand, participants might feel more moral outrage toward bisexual 
and transgender individuals when compared to other groups because of the uncertainty 
about their gender and sexual orientation. 
Method 
Participants 
 One hundred and seventy five undergraduate students were recruited via the 
online SONA system (70% female, 29% male, 1% other; Mage = 23, SD age = 4.64). Fifty-
five percent of participants were White, 26% were Hispanic, 7% were Asian, 6% were 
Black, and 5% described their ethnicity as “other.” Eighty-eight percent of participants 
reported that they were heterosexual, while 7% were bisexual, 3% were gay or lesbian, 
and 2% reported their sexual orientation as “other.” I chose to include non-heterosexual 
participants because LGBT individuals might still have negative opinions of others 
within the LGBT community (Mohr & Rochlen, 1999). 
Procedure 
 Participants were recruited via SONA to participate in this study in exchange for 
one research credit for class. They were first informed that all information would be 
confidential and that they could skip questions or stop participating at any time without 
being penalized. Participants were randomly assigned to give their opinions about one of 
ten groups: lesbians, heterosexual women, gay men, heterosexual men, bisexual women, 
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bisexual men, pre-op transgender women, pre-op transgender men, post-op transgender 
women, or post-op transgender men. To reduce social desirability concerns, participants 
were instructed to answer questions based on what stereotypes they believe to exist, 
rather than their personal beliefs using previous methodology (Devine & Elliot, 1995). 
Participants answered items about their perceptions of the group’s gender and sexuality 
and the level of moral outrage they felt about the group.  
Materials and Measures  
Perceived sexual orientation. Participants were asked, “If you had to guess how 
the average American would assume that a lesbian woman is attracted to, who would it 
be?” Participants answered on a sliding scale from 0 to 100, with 0 representing attracted 
to “nobody” and 100 representing “attracted to completely men.” 1 Thus, higher numbers 
indicate a higher attraction to men. This question was repeated with the option of 0 
representing “nobody” and 100 representing “attracted to completely women,” where 
higher numbers indicate a higher attraction to women. 
Perceived biological sex. Participants were told, “Biological sex is the physical 
sex characteristics an individual is born with and develops including genitalia, body 
shape, voice pitch, body hair, hormones, chromosomes, etc.” and then asked, “If you had 
to guess how the average American would classify a lesbian woman’s biological sex, 
what would it be?” Participants answered on a sliding scale from 0 to 100, with 0 
representing “asexual” and 100 representing “completely male.” Thus, higher numbers 
indicate a stronger belief that the group in question is biologically male. Again, this 
                                                
1 Participants were asked to respond about only one of the ten groups; lesbian woman in 
the measures thus holds the place of the target group was specific to the condition to 
which the participant was assigned. 
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question was repeated with the option of 0 representing “asexual” and 100 representing 
“completely female,” with higher numbers indicating a stronger belief that the group is 
biologically female. 
Perceived gender identity. Participants were told, “Gender identity is how an 
individual, in their own head, defines their gender based on how much they align (or 
don't align) with what they understand to be the options for gender.” and then asked, “If 
you had to guess how the average American would classify a lesbian woman’s gender 
identity, what would it be?” Participants answered on a sliding scale from 0 to 100, with 
0 representing “non-gendered” and 100 representing “complete man-ness.” Thus, higher 
numbers indicated a stronger belief that the group identifies as male. This question was 
again repeated with 0 representing “non-gendered” and 100 representing “complete 
woman-ness,” with higher numbers indicating a stronger belief that the group identifies 
as female. 
Sexual fixedness scale. Participants completed 7-items assessing their belief that 
the group’s sexual orientation is fixed (e.g., “They have clear gender preferences for 
sexual partners,” “Their gender preferences for sexual partners are fixed and 
unchangeable,” “They are likely to exhibit change in whether they prefer men or women 
in the future,” “Their gender preferences for sexual partners is fluid and changeable,” 
“They have a certain sexual orientation and they cannot really do much to change it,” 
“Their sexual orientation is something about them that they cannot change much.,” and 
“They can try new things, but they cannot really change their basic sexual orientation”) 
on 7-point Likert scales ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”. Higher 
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scores indicated a stronger belief that the target group’s sexual orientation is fixed and 
unchangeable (Cronbach's α = .83). 
Gender certainty. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they were 
certain of a lesbian woman’s gender on an 11-point scale from 0% (not at all certain) to 
100% (completely certain). Thus, higher numbers indicate more certainty in the target 
group’s gender. 
Sexual orientation certainty.  Participants were asked to rate the extent to which 
they were certain of a lesbian woman’s sexual orientation on an 11-point scale from 0% 
(not at all certain) to 100% (completely certain). Thus, higher numbers indicate more 
certainty in the target group’s sexual orientation. 
Moral outrage scale. Participants answered 4 items assessing their moral outrage 
toward the target group (e.g., “I feel a desire to hurt them,” “I believe they are evil to the 
core,” “I feel morally outraged by them,” and “I feel a compelling desire to punish them;” 
Skitka et al., 2004) on 6-point Likert scales ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to 
“Strongly Agree”. Higher numbers indicate more moral outrage toward the group 
(Cronbach's α = .91). 
RESULTS 
 All dependent measures were analyzed with 2 (gender) X 5 (LGBT status: 
heterosexual, gay, bisexual, pre-op trans, post-op trans) between-subjects ANOVAs. 
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Perceived sexual orientation2. There was a significant main effect of LGBT 
status on the belief that the group is attracted to men, F(4, 165) = 3.21, p = .014. 
However, post-hoc tests using the Tukey HSD correction revealed that no differences 
reached significance, all ps ≥ .24.  
This main effect was qualified by a significant gender by LGBT status interaction, 
F(4, 165) = 44.79, p < .001. Simple effects analyses revealed that—as one would 
expect—for heterosexuals, participants predictably believed women (M = 83.33, SD = 
24.87) were significantly more attracted to men than were men (M = 10.00, SD = 13.10), 
F(1, 22) = 66.45, p < .001. For gay groups, participants believed men (M = 91.65, SD = 
8.34) were significantly more attracted to men than women (M = 25.00, SD = 24.48), F(1, 
38) = 148.43, p < .001. Interestingly, for bisexuals, participants believed men (M = 65.00, 
SD = 16.82) were significantly more attracted to men than women (M = 42.28, SD = 
16.56), F(1, 39) = 18.68, p < .001. For both pre- and post-op trangender targets, 
participants perceived men and women as equally attracted to men; all other effects were 
nonsignificant, all Fs ≤ .55, ps ≥ .46. 
                                                
2 Because the two scales were conversely redundant, I am reporting only one set of 
results on perceptions of attraction to men. When I analyzed the perceptions of attraction 
to women the pattern of results was the same, but reversed.  
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Figure 1. The effect of gender and sexual orientation on perceived sexual orientation. 
Biological sex3. Participants saw men as significantly more biologically male (M 
= 64.88, SD = 3.31) than women (M = 43.27, SD = 3.28), F(1, 152) = 21.51, p < .001. 
There was also a significant main effect of LGBT status on the belief that the group is 
biologically male, F(4, 152) = 4.23, p = .003. Post-hoc tests using the Tukey HSD 
correction revealed that heterosexual groups (M = 40.78) were seen as significantly less 
biologically male than pre-op transgender groups (M = 69.96), p = .001 and post-op 
transgender groups (M = 61.83), p = .015. There were no other significant differences 
between groups, all ps ≥ .10. 
These main effects were qualified by the predicted significant gender by LGBT 
status interaction, F(4, 152) = 10.08, p < .001. Simple effects analyses revealed that for 
heterosexuals, participants believed men (M = 68.22, SD = 35.36) were biologically more 
male than were women (M = 13.33, SD = 16.08), F(1, 19) = 22.92, p < .001. Similarly, 
                                                
3 Because the two scales were conversely redundant, I am reporting only one set of 
results on perceptions of biological “male-ness.” When I analyzed the perceptions of 
biological “female-ness” the pattern of results was the same, but reversed. 
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for gay groups, participants believed men (M = 69.14, SD = 24.23) were biologically 
more male than women (M = 31.27, SD = 32.64), F(1, 34) = 16.01, p < .001. For 
bisexuals, participants again believed men (M = 70.05, SD = 30.18) were biologically 
more male than women (M = 28.88, SD = 21.99), F(1, 36) = 21.43, p < .001. For pre-op 
transgender groups, participants perceived men (M = 68.13) and women (M = 71.80) to 
be equally biologically male, F(1, 29)=.09, p=.76. For post-op transgender groups, 
participants believed men (M = 48.87, SD = 28.78) were biologically less male than were 
women (M = 71.10, SD = 26.98), F(1, 34) = 5.62, p = .024. 
 
Figure 2. The effect of gender and sexual orientation on perceived biological sex. 
Gender identity4. Participants saw male target groups as having greater male 
gender identity (M = 54.08, SD = 2.93) than did women (M = 40.12, SD = 2.95), F(1, 
158) = 11.27, p = .001. This main effect was qualified by the predicted significant gender 
by LGBT status interaction, F(4, 158) = 6.20, p < .001. Simple effects analyses revealed 
                                                
4 Because the two scales were conversely redundant, I am reporting only one set of 
results on perceptions of male gender identity. When I analyzed the perceptions of female 
gender identity, the pattern of results was the same, but reversed. 
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that for heterosexuals, participants believed men (M = 81.70, SD = 23.90) had greater 
male gender identity than women (M = 24.42, SD = 29.89), F(1, 20) = 23.91, p<.001. For 
bisexuals, participants believed men (M = 53.83, SD = 20.25) had greater male gender 
identity than women (M = 35.81, SD = 23.39), F(1, 37) = 6.58, p = .015. For gay, pre-op 
transgender, and post-op transgender groups, participants perceived men and women as 
having similar levels of male gender identity; all other effects were nonsignificant, all Fs 
≤ .65, ps ≥ .42.  
 
Figure 3. The effect of gender and sexual orientation on perceived gender identity. 
Sexual fixedness scale. As predicted, participants perceived men has having a 
significantly more fixed sexuality (M = 4.66, SD = .13) compared to women (M = 4.16, 
SD = .13), F(1, 165) = 7.77, p = .006. There was also a significant main effect of LGBT 
status on perceived sexual fixedness, F(4, 165) = 3.51, p = .009. Post-hoc tests using the 
Tukey HSD correction revealed that gay groups (M = 4.92) were perceived as having 
significantly higher sexual fixedness than bisexuals (M = 3.93), p = .002. There were no 
other significant differences between groups, all ps ≥ .17. 
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These main effects were qualified by the predicted significant gender by LGBT 
status interaction, F(4, 165) = 3.03, p = .019. Simple effects analyses revealed that for 
heterosexuals, participants believed men (M = 5.38, SD = 1.03) were significantly more 
fixed in their sexuality than women (M = 3.64, SD = 1.26), F(1, 21) = 11.96, p = .002. 
For gay target groups, participants believed men (M = 5.22, SD = 1.07) were marginally 
more fixed in their sexuality than women (M = 4.56, SD = 1.09), F(1, 38) = 3.71, p = 
.062. For bisexual, pre-op transgender, and post-op transgender groups, participants 
believed men and women were similar in their sexual fixedness; all other effects were 
nonsignificant, all Fs ≤ .98, ps ≥ .33. 
 
Figure 4. The effect of gender and sexual orientation on perceived sexual fixedness. 
Gender certainty. There were no significant main effects nor interaction on 
gender certainty, all Fs ≤ 1.60, ps ≥ .21. 
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Figure 5. The effect of gender and sexual orientation on gender certainty. 
Sexual orientation certainty. There was a significant main effect of LGBT status 
on the level of certainty about the group’s sexual orientation, F(4, 166) = 5.44, p < .001. 
Post-hoc tests using the Tukey HSD correction revealed that participants felt significantly 
less certain about pre-op transgender groups’ sexual orientation (M = 3.76) than 
heterosexual (M = 7.29, p = .002), gay (M = 6.27, p = .014), and bisexual (M = 5.95, p = 
.045) groups’ sexual orientations. Participants also felt significantly less certain about 
post-op transgender groups’ sexual orientation (M = 4.33) than heterosexual groups’ 
sexual orientations (p = .013) and marginally less certain when compared to gay groups 
(p = .081). All other comparisons were nonsignificant, all ps ≥ .21. 
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Figure 6. The effect of gender and sexual orientation on sexual orientation certainty. 
Moral outrage scale. The predicted gender by LGBT status interaction was 
significant, F(4, 165) = 2.45, p = .048. Simple effects analyses revealed that for pre-op 
transgender groups, participants felt more moral outrage toward men (M = 1.60, SD = 
.90) than women (M = 1.08, SD = .26), F(1, 31) = 4.55, p = .041. Though nonsignificant, 
it is interesting to note that the pattern was the same for all groups except for bisexuals. 
That is, for bisexuals, participants felt less moral outrage toward men (M = 1.11) than 
woman (M = 1.46), F(1, 39) = 2.52, p = .121. All other effects were nonsignificant, all Fs 
≤ 2.78, ps ≥ .10. 
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Figure 7. The effect of gender and sexual orientation on moral outrage. 
Correlations 
 To determine which of my variables related to each other, I ran bivariate 
correlations between all variables (see Table 1). Specifically, I was interested in which 
perceptions were correlated with my outcome prejudice variable of moral outrage, which 
I subsequently used to inform my mediation analyses. I found that only sexual fixedness, 
r = -.16, p = .036, and gender certainty, r = -.20, p = .008, significantly (and negatively) 
correlated with moral outrage. Thus, the more fixed the sexuality and the more certain 
they were about gender, the less morally outraged participants felt toward the target 
group. All other correlations with moral outrage were non-significant (all ps ≥ .06). 
However, I chose to only include sexual fixedness as a mediator for my models because 
gender and sexuality did not have any main effects or interactions on gender certainty. 
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Table 1 
Bivariate Correlations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Attracted to men -       
2. Bio male .128 -      
3. Identify as male -.177* .245** -     
4. Sexual fixedness .116 .138 .133 -    
5. Gender certainty .022 .178* .053 .120 -   
6. SO certainty .060 .006 .043 .236** .521*** -  
7. Moral outrage -.039 -.052 -.087 -.159* -.201** -.144 - 
*p<.05 
**p<.01 
***p<.001 
 
Mediation analyses 
 Next, I tested whether the indirect gender effect on moral outrage through sexual 
fixedness would depend on target sexual orientation. I tested these moderated mediation 
models using Hayes (2013) PROCESS macro. I tested only sexual fixedness as my 
mediator because it was the only variable that was affected by gender and sexual 
orientation and related to moral outrage. I ran four models comparing heterosexual 
groups against each of the other LGBT subgroups (i.e., heterosexual vs. gay/lesbian, 
heterosexual vs. bisexual, heterosexual vs. pre-op transgender, and heterosexual vs. post-
op transgender; see Table 2 for all conditional indirect effects). Because only two were 
significant, I will discuss them in more detail. 
 Heterosexual versus gay as moderator. The indirect effect of gender on moral 
outrage through sexual fixedness was significant for heterosexual target groups, indirect 
effect = -.26, 95% CIs = -.53, -.13, and gay target groups, indirect effect = -.10, 95% CIs 
= -.25, -.003. Thus, participants thought that heterosexual and gay men had more fixed 
 31 
sexuality and, in turn, felt more moral outrage toward them when compared to 
heterosexual and lesbians women, respectively. 
 Heterosexual versus post-op transgender as moderator. The indirect effect of 
gender on moral outrage through sexual fixedness was significant for heterosexual target 
groups, indirect effect = .16, 95% CIs = -.10, -.02, but not for post-op transgender target 
groups, indirect effect = -.04, 95% CIs = -.25, .01. Thus, this model again revealed that 
participants thought that heterosexual men had a more fixed sexuality and, in turn, felt 
more moral outrage toward them when compared to heterosexual women.  
Table 2 
 
Moderated Mediation Analyses: The Effect of Target Gender on Moral Outrage Through 
Sexual Fixedness as a Function of Target LGBT Status (Versus Heterosexuals). 
 
 Indirect Effect SE 95% CIs 
Model 1:  
     Heterosexual 
 
-.26 
 
.09 
 
-.53, -.13* 
     Gay -.10 .06 -.25, -.003* 
Model 2:  
     Heterosexual 
 
-.03 
 
.09 
 
-.23, .13 
     Bisexual .0003 .01 -.03, .03 
Model 3:  
     Heterosexual 
 
-.11 
 
.09 
 
-.34, .03 
     Pre-Op Transgender .02 .04 -.03, .13 
Model 4:  
     Heterosexual 
 
-.16 
 
.10 
 
-.44, -.02* 
     Post-Op Transgender -.04 .05 -.25, .01 
*Denotes a significant conditional indirect effect because the confidence interval does not 
include zero. 
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Discussion 
It would be reasonable to predict that a target’s gender category would determine 
other people’s perceptions of the target’s biological sex and gender identity, and that a 
target’s sexual orientation category would determine other people’s perceptions of the 
target’s sexuality (i.e., assumptions about who they are attracted to and the fixed nature 
of their sexuality). In other words, to predict that there would be a main effect of gender 
on perceptions of gender and a main effect of sexual orientation on perceptions of 
sexuality. Yet, I predicted and found that it is important to take into account the 
intersection of gender and sexual orientation. Gender and sexual orientation consistently 
interacted to drive perceptions of gender and sexuality. The effect of gender on 
perceptions of gender and sexuality depended on sexual orientation; the effect of sexual 
orientation on perceptions of gender and sexuality depended on gender. Further, gender 
and sexual orientation interacted to determine the level of prejudice directed toward the 
groups, as measured by moral outrage. Thus, I found the predicted result insomuch as the 
concepts of gender and sexuality are highly intertwined in determining how people 
perceive these LGBT subgroups and the extent to which they exhibit a prejudicial 
reaction. Next, I will describe the pattern of these interactions on perceptions and 
prejudice. 
Perceptions of gender. Logically, participants should have expected men of all 
LGBT groups to be more biologically male than women except for post-op transgender 
targets, as they change their gender by definition. As expected, participants believed 
straight, gay, and bisexual men to be more biologically male than their female 
counterparts. For post-op transgender targets, on the other hand, females were seen as 
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more biologically male than post-op transgender males. This makes sense, as they 
changed their genitalia surgically. Surprisingly, when considering pre-op transgender 
targets, participants believed male and female pre-op transgender targets to be equally 
male, biologically speaking. So it did not matter what gender a pre-op transgender 
identified as when it comes to biological sex – participants still saw them as more male 
than female. Perhaps this is a stereotype about transgender individuals? It might be the 
case that because male-to-female transgender individuals are more visible in the media 
(e.g., Laverne Cox, Caitlyn Jenner), people are more inclined to picture a male-to-female 
transgender whether they are described as male or female. 
Gender identity seems to be a little less clear than biological sex. Again, we 
would expect all males to be perceived as having a male gender identity, including 
transgender targets (as transgender males would likely consider themselves male, as that 
is how they are labeling themselves). One potential difference between gender identity 
and biological sex might manifest for gay and lesbian targets. Specifically, lesbians might 
be seen as having more male gender identity than gay men, given that gay men and 
lesbians are often stereotyped as being similar to the opposite gender (Kite & Deaux, 
1980). However, the expected results held only for heterosexual and bisexual 
participants. For gay, lesbian, pre-op, and post-op transgender targets, there were no 
gender differences—meaning people saw all of these groups as having a similar gender 
identity, despite being labeled male or female. For example, gay men and lesbians were 
both seen as similarly identifying as male to a similar degree (right around the midpoint 
of the maleness scale). Perhaps inversion theory could explain this, as believing that gay 
individuals are more similar to the opposite sex could cause some confusion as to what 
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gender they identify as. Both pre-op and post-op transgender targets’ gender identity did 
not differ based on gender. Perhaps participants were confused as to which gender the 
target identified as (i.e., was a transgender male a female-to-male or a male-to-female?). 
In contrast to biological gender, participants saw pre-op transgender targets to be more 
female than male, which, if they are indeed picturing a male-to-female transgender 
individual, makes sense (since they would, by definition, identify as female). 
Perceptions of sexual orientation. Naturally, it would make sense for 
participants to perceive heterosexual women (versus heterosexual men) and gay men 
(versus lesbians) to be more attracted to men, while bisexuals should have no gender 
differences. While this was the case for heterosexual and gay targets, bisexual males were 
also perceived to be significantly more attracted to men than bisexual females. Perhaps 
this is because people believe that men’s sexuality is more fixed than women’s 
(Diamond, 2003; Peplau, 2003), and thus once a man has one same-sex encounter, he is 
gay. However, this does not explain why bisexual women are considered to be less 
attracted to men, as women are likely to be considered straight even if they have same-
sex encounters (Lannutti & Denes, 2012). It is possible that a stereotype exist that asserts 
that bisexuals are just gay or lesbian individuals that are afraid to “commit” to being 
completely non-heterosexual. Furthermore, there were no gender differences in the 
transgender target groups. This should not be the case given that transgender does not 
impact sexual orientation in reality, but overall, participants believed all transgender 
targets were more attracted to men than women. There might be a stereotype that all 
transgender males are gay and all transgender females are straight. Maybe this has to do 
again with the more common image of a male-to-female transgender individual; but this 
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raises the question: Would it also hold true for post-op transgender targets, considering 
participants believed female targets in this group to be more biologically male than their 
male counterparts? Perhaps participants are relying more on gender identity, as there was 
no gender difference there for post-op transgender targets, either. 
Furthermore, as expected, participants believed heterosexual men were more 
fixed in their sexuality than heterosexual women. There was also a marginal effect such 
that participants believed gay men were somewhat more fixed in their sexuality than 
lesbians. Participants perceived bisexual men and women to be equally fixed in their 
sexuality. This logically makes sense given that bisexuals are, by definition, more fluid in 
their sexuality than other groups. Similarly, there were no gender differences for pre-op 
transgender and post-op transgender. Perceptions of sexual fixedness should not be 
affected for transgender groups since, again, transgender is about changing gender, not 
sexual orientation. That being said, perhaps participants believe that if these groups are 
fluid in one aspect (i.e., gender) they are likely to be fluid in the other aspect (i.e., 
sexuality), regardless of gender. 
Certainty. Participants did not differ in their certainty of target gender for any of 
the groups. I would expect participants to be less certain of transgender targets’ gender, 
as they are changing their gender or identifying as a different gender than was 
biologically determined at birth, but this did not play out. Maybe participants are just 
reluctant to admit their uncertainty. As previously mentioned, people are constantly 
trying to reduce uncertainty (Pirlott & Neuberg, 2014). If they admit that they feel 
uncertain, perhaps it becomes too hard to avoid, and thus participants convince 
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themselves that they feel more confident about their assessment of a transgender target’s 
gender than they actually do. 
Similarly, there was no interaction of gender and sexuality on sexual orientation 
certainty. However, there was a main effect such that participants were more certain of 
heterosexuals’ sexual orientation than pre-op transgender targets’. It is not surprising that 
participants felt relatively certain about heterosexual’s sexual orientation, but it is 
surprising that the only significant comparison was to pre-op transgender targets. If 
anything, I would expect comparatively less certainty for bisexuals, because they are less 
defined in their sexuality. Being transgender does not have anything to do with sexuality. 
And why might this comparison only be significant for pre-op, but not post-op, 
transgender targets? Perhaps people think that, because pre-op transgender individuals 
might still be in a transitioning phase (as compared to post-op transgender individuals 
who have already transitioned), they are more likely to be questioning other aspects of 
their lives – such as their sexuality.  
Moral Outrage. There was an interaction of sexual orientation and gender on 
moral outrage such that participants felt more moral outrage toward male pre-op 
transgender individuals than female pre-op transgender individual. Although one might 
expect more differences among the groups, given that we were asking people to explicitly 
express intense negative reactions about a group with no other information (e.g., the 
extent to which they thought bisexual men were evil to the core), in hindsight it is 
actually somewhat surprising that I found any effects here at all. In my past research 
where we did find differing levels of moral outrage toward gay men (versus lesbians) in 
particular, I assessed moral outrage toward someone who committed a crime, so that 
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participants have something at which to direct their prejudice. Further, it was not clear 
that we were investigating the effect of the target’s sexual orientation like I did in this 
study. In this context, participants were willing to state that they “feel a desire to hurt” 
pre-op transgender males, “believe they are evil to the core,” “feel morally outraged by 
them,” and “feel a compelling desire to punish them.” Because of social desirability bias 
(Devine & Elliott, 1995), it makes sense that participants did not to agree to such drastic 
statements. Admittedly, the numbers were all still very low on the scale, and yet a 
significant difference emerged between pre-op transgender men and women. Why are 
people comparatively more willing to admit prejudicial reactions to pre-op transgender 
men? Perhaps people believe there is not a stigma for discriminating against this group. 
When participants picture a pre-op transgender man, perhaps they are envisioning a 
cross-dresser, rather than an individual with a true transgender identity. With media 
representations such as the contestants on Ru Paul’s Drag Race and Tim Curry’s fan 
favorite Dr. Frank-N-Furter in The Rocky Horror Picture Show, maybe people think that 
a pre-op transgender man is, in reality, just a man dressing up as a woman, with no real 
intention of being a woman. With this in mind, perhaps we do not see this same pattern in 
post-op transgender targets because people perceive them as being more serious about 
their gender identity (i.e., if they were willing to go through surgery, they must truly want 
to change). 
Explaining prejudice. Only two variables correlated with moral outrage – gender 
certainty and sexual fixedness. However, because the manipulations did not affect gender 
certainty, I tested only sexual fixedness as a potential mediator. Specifically, the more 
sexually fixed participants perceived a group to be, the less moral outrage they felt. This 
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is surprising because it contradicts the past research I have conducted. Thus far, my 
previous findings indicate that the more fixed a group’s sexuality, the more moral outrage 
participants report (Salerno et al., in preparation). What is different about these results 
that is causing this effect to flip? 
Furthermore, sexual fixedness mediated the relationship between gender and 
moral outrage for some LGBT groups. Specifically, participants believed that 
heterosexual men (versus heterosexual women) and gay men (versus lesbians) had a more 
fixed sexuality, and the more they thought their sexuality was fixed, the less moral 
outrage they felt toward these men. It is surprising that we only found these effects for 
heterosexual and gay groups. It might be the case that people are more comfortable 
saying negative things about heterosexuals, as compared to the other target groups. 
However, this does not explain why this effect worked for gay men (versus lesbians) as 
well. Furthermore, the ANOVAs indicated that participants felt more moral outrage 
toward pre-op transgender male targets than female, indicating that people might be more 
comfortable expressing negative opinions about pre-op transgender males as well. 
Additionally, it is surprising that I only found an effect for heterosexual targets in two of 
my four models. This suggests that perhaps the significance was affected by the other 
variables in the model. 
Limitations 
 This was a preliminary exploratory study with the purpose of informing future 
research on the topic of bisexual and transgender individuals. Though I did make some 
predictions driven by the current literature and my previous research on gay men versus 
lesbians, I was unable to make specific a priori hypotheses about most of my variables 
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because of this exploratory nature. As a result, my choice of variables to test in my 
models, analyses, and conclusions were mostly data-driven rather than theory-driven. 
Furthermore, my relatively small sample size left me with somewhat low power. In fact, 
the power was too low to be confident in the results from the complex moderated 
mediation analyses. This may have contributed to the small number of significant 
pathways; perhaps with a larger sample, I might find more significance in these models. 
 Additionally, participants’ responses might have been influenced by social 
desirability concerns. In my past research, I have asked about perceptions of gays and 
lesbians in the context of an ambiguous sex crime. Thus, participants were likely to 
answer more honestly in those studies because their prejudice could be hidden by the 
ambiguity of the situation (and they were also less likely to guess that the study was 
about discrimination). Here, rather than trying to tap into implicit bias playing out in case 
judgments, I asked them to explicitly label and express prejudice toward a group based 
on only the target’s gender and LGBT subgroup. I tried to avoid bias by asking 
participants to respond with how the average American perceives the target group as 
opposed to their own personal opinions, but that was likely not enough to eliminate social 
desirability concerns. Furthermore, I told participants directly that I was interested in 
perceptions of different groups, so they were likely aware that I was analyzing prejudice 
and discrimination, activating social desirability. Similarly, simply asking about 
perceptions in the absence of an ambiguous scenario might have caused further problems. 
For example, asking about moral outrage might not be as valid in this scenario as in a 
study including a crime vignette simply because I did not give them anything to be 
morally outraged about. However, the fact that I found a gender effect on moral outrage 
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for pre-op transgender individuals means that either prejudice toward this group is 
unusually high, or that people just believe that it is relatively acceptable to express open 
outrage toward this group.  
Furthermore, my sample was entirely made up of students, rather than community 
members. Thus, my participants might be more educated, younger, more liberal and, in 
turn, less prejudiced (or at least more concerned about social desirability) than the general 
population. Perhaps with a community sample, I might find more prejudicial responses—
either because they are more prejudiced coming from an older generation or because they 
are more willing to admit prejudicial responses. 
 Because I wanted to learn how participants perceived each target group with as 
little influence as possible, I might have caused some confusion in the four transgender 
conditions. I simply asked about a “pre-op transgender male,” “pre-op transgender 
female,” “post-op transgender male,” or “post-op transgender female.” I did not specify if 
I meant male-to-female or female-to-male in any of these conditions, but it is likely that 
some participants might have perceived a male transgender target group to be male-to-
female, while some might have pictured a female-to-male in this circumstance. However, 
this was a strategic, intentional first step. Because I did not know what people would 
think about these groups, I did not want to be too specific so that I could get an accurate 
representation of participants’ perceptions of their target without any sort of direction. 
Had I been more specific, I might not have been able to pick up on certain nuances 
between transgender groups (such as the belief that all pre-op transgender individuals are 
biologically male). 
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Future Directions 
 I plan to apply for funding to follow up this study with a replication using 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. This will allow me to obtain a much larger sample size and 
thus be able to make more definitive conclusions. Importantly, this will also allow me to 
test whether my effects depend on participant characteristics, such as gender. Because of 
the small sample size in the present study, I could not look at male versus female 
participants’ differences in perceptions of target groups. This is important to test given 
that several studies indicate that there are differences in the way men and women view 
non-heterosexuality (Herek, 1998; Herek, 2000b; Pirlott & Neuberg, 2014). It would also 
be interesting to see how other factors such as religiosity, political orientation, and 
personal sexual and gender identity affect perceptions as well. 
 The next step will be to apply this information to the legal context. I plan to 
extend my previous findings about punitiveness toward gay and lesbian sex offenders to 
bisexual and transgender offenders as well, to see how the interaction of sexual 
orientation and gender further might be different for these groups. My past studies 
indicated that people were more punitive toward gay men (versus lesbians) because they 
believed their sexuality to be more fixed, and thus felt more moral outrage (Salerno et al., 
in preparation). The present results reflect a negative correlation between sexual 
fixedness and moral outrage. If this pattern holds true after the Mechanical Turk 
replication, perhaps putting this into a legal context will produce a more consistent result. 
If not, I will at least be able to make more definitive conclusions about how the 
intersection of gender and sexuality affect prejudice. 
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Conclusion 
 Though the exploratory nature of this study calls for follow-up studies to be able 
to make any definitive conclusions, it is clear that the intertwined nature of gender and 
sexual orientation impacts perceptions of gender and sexuality and, in turn, prejudice. It 
is not enough to focus on prejudice and discrimination toward non-heterosexuals, or even 
just toward gay men and lesbians; each LGBT subgroup is unique and needs to be treated 
and researched as such. If we ever hope to understand the differences in prejudice, and as 
a result the possible reasons why prejudice exists, toward these groups, we as researchers 
must understand the importance of gender and sexual orientation and how perceptions of 
each impact each other. 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
 
We have some questions about how you think about other people and groups. 
 
For this portion of this survey please think about whether there is a cultural stereotype 
about LESBIAN WOMEN. Please answer the following questions about what 
stereotypes you think exist, even if you do not believe they are true. Later, you will be 
asked about what stereotypes you personally believe are true. 
 
What are the first 3 stereotypes that you think the average American has about lesbian 
women's sexual behavior? 
 
If you had to guess how the average American would classify a lesbian 
woman's gender, what would it be? 
• Male 
• Female 
• Other 
 
If you had to guess how the average American would classify a lesbian 
woman's gender, what would it be? Please indicate the point on the scale that represents 
this group OR choose to click the box to  indicate a belief that they are neither male nor 
female. 
• 0 (Exclusively female) 
• 10 
• 20 
• 30 
• 40 
• 50 (Equal parts male and female) 
• 60 
• 70 
• 80 
• 90 
• 100 (Exclusively male) 
• Neither 
 
If you had to guess how the average American would classify a lesbian 
woman's sexual orientation, what would it be? 
• Heterosexual 
• Gay 
• Bisexual 
• Other 
 
If you had to guess how the average American would classify a lesbian 
woman's sexual orientation, what would it be? Please indicate the point on the scale that 
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represents this group OR choose to click the box to indicate a belief that they are asexual 
(they do not experience sexual attraction). 
• 0 (Exclusively heterosexual) 
• 10 
• 20 
• 30 
• 40 
• 50 (Completely bisexual) 
• 60 
• 70 
• 80 
• 90 
• 100 (Exclusively gay) 
• Neither 
 
To which gender would the average American say a lesbian woman is attracted? Please 
indicate the point on the scale that represents this group OR choose to click the box to 
indicate a belief that they are not attracted to either gender. 
• 0 (Exclusively opposite gender) 
• 10 
• 20 
• 30 
• 40 
• 50 (Equal attraction to both genders) 
• 60 
• 70 
• 80 
• 90 
• 100 (Exclusively same gender) 
• Neither 
 
If you had to guess how the average American would classify a lesbian 
woman's sexual orientation, what would it be? 
• Exclusively heterosexual 
• Predominantly heterosexual/only incidentally homosexual 
• Predominantly heterosexual but more than incidentally homosexual 
• Equally heterosexual and homosexual 
• Predominantly homosexual but more than incidentally heterosexual 
• Predominantly homosexual/only incidentally heterosexual 
• Exclusively homosexual 
 
If you had to guess how the average American would classify a lesbian 
woman's gender identity, what would it be? Please indicate the point on both scales. 0 
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represents non-gendered, and 10 represents complete "woman-ness" or "man-
ness".  
 
Woman-ness 
• 0 (Non-gendered) 
• 10 
• 20 
• 30 
• 40 
• 50 
• 60 
• 70 
• 80 
• 90 
• 100 (Complete woman-ness) 
 
Man-ness 
• 0 (Non-gendered) 
• 10 
• 20 
• 30 
• 40 
• 50 
• 60 
• 70 
• 80 
• 90 
• 100 (Complete man-ness) 
 
If you had to guess how the average American would classify a lesbian 
woman's gender expression, what would it be? Please indicate the point on both scales. 0 
represents agender, and 10 represents complete masculinity or femininity. 
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Masculine 
• 0 (Agender) 
• 10 
• 20 
• 30 
• 40 
• 50 
• 60 
• 70 
• 80 
• 90 
• 100 (Complete masculinity) 
 
Feminine 
• 0 (Agender) 
• 10 
• 20 
• 30 
• 40 
• 50 
• 60 
• 70 
• 80 
• 90 
• 100 (Complete femininity) 
 
If you had to guess how the average American would classify a lesbian 
woman's biological sex, what would it be? Please indicate the point on both scales. 0 
represents asex, and 10 represents complete "female-ness" or "male-ness". 
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Female-ness 
• 0 (Asex) 
• 10 
• 20 
• 30 
• 40 
• 50 
• 60 
• 70 
• 80 
• 90 
• 100 (Complete female-ness) 
 
Male-ness 
• 0 (Asex) 
• 10 
• 20 
• 30 
• 40 
• 50 
• 60 
• 70 
• 80 
• 90 
• 100 (Complete male-ness) 
 
If you had to guess how the average American would classify who a lesbian woman is 
attracted to, who would it be? Please indicate the point on both scales. 0 represents 
attracted to nobody, and 10 represents completely attracted to 
men/males/masculinity or women/females/femininity. 
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Men/Males/Masculinity 
• 0 (Nobody) 
• 10 
• 20 
• 30 
• 40 
• 50 
• 60 
• 70 
• 80 
• 90 
• 100 (Completely men/males/masculinity) 
 
Women/Females/Femininity 
• 0 (Nobody) 
• 10 
• 20 
• 30 
• 40 
• 50 
• 60 
• 70 
• 80 
• 90 
• 100 (Completely women/females/femininity) 
 
Please use this grid to indicate where the average American believes lesbian 
women would fall in regards to gender and sexual orientation. 
 
The horizontal line represents gender, with points left of center representing men and 
points right of center representing women. The further away from center, the higher the 
degree to which they are exclusively associated with that gender. 
 
The vertical line represents sexual orientation, with points higher than center 
representing gay and points lower than center representing heterosexual. The further 
away from center, the higher the degree to which they are exclusively associated with 
that sexual orientation. 
 
For example, a point directly in the middle of the grid indicates that the average 
American would say a lesbian woman is approximately in the middle of being male and 
female and of being gay and straight. 
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Your point does not need to fall on the bold center lines. It can fall anywhere within the 
grid. 
 
 
 
 
How certain are you about a lesbian women's gender? 
• 0% (Not at all certain) 
• 10% 
• 20% 
• 30% 
• 40% 
• 50% 
• 60% 
• 70% 
• 80% 
• 90% 
• 100% (Completely certain) 
 
To what extent does your level of uncertainty about a lesbian woman's gender make you 
feel uncomfortable? 
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• 0% (Not at all uncomfortable) 
• 10% 
• 20% 
• 30% 
• 40% 
• 50% 
• 60% 
• 70% 
• 80% 
• 90% 
• 100% (Extremely uncomfortable) 
 
How certain are you about a lesbian women's sexual orientation? 
• 0% (Not at all certain) 
• 10% 
• 20% 
• 30% 
• 40% 
• 50% 
• 60% 
• 70% 
• 80% 
• 90% 
• 100% (Completely certain) 
 
To what extent does your level of uncertainty about a lesbian woman's sexual orientation 
make you feel uncomfortable? 
• 0% (Not at all uncomfortable) 
• 10% 
• 20% 
• 30% 
• 40% 
• 50% 
• 60% 
• 70% 
• 80% 
• 90% 
• 100% (Extremely uncomfortable) 
 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following items 
about LESBIAN WOMEN. 
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 Strongl
y 
Disagre
e 
Disagre
e 
Disagre
e 
Slightly 
Neither 
Disagree or 
Agree/Unsur
e 
Agree 
Slightl
y 
Agre
e 
Strongl
y Agree 
They prefer 
women 
(rather than 
men) 
sexually. 
¢ ¢ 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
Their sexual 
preference 
for women is 
fixed and 
unchangeabl
e. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
They are 
likely to 
exhibit 
change in 
whether they 
prefer men or 
women in the 
future. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
Their sexual 
preference 
for women is 
fluid and 
changeable. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
They have a 
certain 
sexual 
orientation 
and they 
cannot really 
do much to 
change it. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
Their sexual 
orientation is 
something 
about them 
that they 
cannot 
change 
much. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
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They can try 
new things, 
but they 
cannot really 
change their 
basic sexual 
orientation. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
Their 
behavior 
violates 
norms in our 
society. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following items 
about LESBIAN WOMEN. 
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 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
They are kind. ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
They are perverted. ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
They are sexually 
promiscuous. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
They have bad 
character. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
They are immoral. ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
They are insincere. ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
They are untruthful. ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
They are normal. ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
They are deviant. ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
There is something 
wrong with them. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
They are likely to 
cheat within a 
committed 
relationship. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
They are desperate. ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
They will have sex 
with anyone. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
They have trouble 
with monogamy. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
I feel a compelling 
desire to punish them. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
I feel a desire to hurt 
them. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
I believe they are evil 
to the core. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
I feel morally 
outraged by them. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following items 
about LESBIAN WOMEN 
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 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
They are likely to prey 
on others who are 
interested in 
experimenting with 
their sexuality. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
They are likely to 
recruit others into 
sexual activity that 
they otherwise would 
not have engaged in. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
They are likely to lure 
others down the path 
to deviant sexual 
activity. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
 
Please use this grid to indicate how angry and disgusted you feel by lesbian women. 
Lesbian women can make you feel high in both, low in both, or high in one and not the 
other. 
  
Along the bottom of the grid is how disgusted you feel about lesbian women, with low 
disgust on the left through high disgust on the right. 
  
Along the left side of the grid represents how angry you feel about lesbian women, from 
low anger on the bottom to high anger at the top. 
  
Please click the box that best matches with your level of disgust and anger about lesbian 
women. 
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Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following items 
about LESBIAN WOMEN. 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Their behavior makes 
me feel anxious. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
Their behavior makes 
me feel fear. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
Their behavior makes 
me feel pity. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
 
Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with each 
according to your attitudes, beliefs, and experiences. It is important for you to realize that 
there are no "right" or "wrong" answers to these questions. People are different, and we 
are interested in how you feel. 
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 Strongly 
Disagree 
Moderately 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Moderately 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
It upsets me to go 
into a situation 
without knowing 
what to expect 
from it. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
I enjoy having a 
clear and 
structured mode of 
life. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
I like to have a 
place for 
everything and 
everything in its 
place. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
I enjoy being 
spontaneous. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
I don’t like 
situations that are 
uncertain. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
I hate to be with 
people who are 
unpredictable. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
I enjoy the 
exhilaration of 
being in 
unpredictable 
situations. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
I become 
uncomfortable 
when the rules in a 
situation are not 
clear. 
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ 
 
Your gender: 
• Male 
• Female 
• Other 
 
Your age (in years) 
 
What ethnicity are you? 
• White 
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• Black 
• Hispanic 
• Asian 
• Other 
 
What is your current religion? That is, what is your current denominational preference? 
PLEASE CHOOSE ALL THAT APPLY: 
• Fundamentalist 
• Christian 
• Catholic 
• Jewish 
• Muslim 
• Hindu 
• Buddhist 
• Non-denominational 
• Agnostic 
• Atheist 
 
How often do you attend religious services? 
• Less than once a year 
• About once a year 
• A few times a year 
• About once a month 
• A few times a month 
• About once a week 
• A few times a week 
• Once a day 
 
How religious do you consider yourself to be? 
• Strongly not religious 
• Not religious 
• Neither religious nor not religious 
• Religious 
• Strongly religious 
 
When it comes to politics, how liberal or conservative are you? 
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• Extremely liberal 
• Liberal 
• Slightly liberal 
• Moderate 
• Slightly conservative 
• Conservative 
• Extremely conservative 
 
What city and state do you live in? 
 
What is your profession? 
 
Which of the following degrees do you have? SELECT ALL THAT APPLY: 
• Some high school 
• High school diploma 
• Some college 
• Associates Degree 
• Bachelors 
• Masters 
• J.D. 
• Doctorate 
• Other 
 
To whom are you most sexually attracted? 
• Men 
• Women 
• Both 
• Neither 
 
Which of the following best describes you these days? 
• Heterosexual or Straight 
• Homosexual, Gay, or Lesbian 
• Bisexual 
• Other 
 
Has any friend, family member, or close acquaintance revealed to you that he or she is 
homosexual? 
• Yes 
• No 
 
Has any friend, family member, or close acquaintance revealed to you that he or she is 
bisexual? 
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• Yes 
• No 
 
Has any friend, family member, or close acquaintance revealed to you that he or she is 
transgender? 
• Yes 
• No 
 
Are there any other thoughts or comments you would like to share with us? 
 
 
 
